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This gives the indigent a short amount of time to secure the
required money and likewise postpones immediately sending him
to jail.
Conclusion
It is submitted that the validity of Frazier rests in its application of the compelling state interest test to the question of
the incarceration of indigents under the alternative sentence.
Since Griffin v. Illinois,70 there has been a growing concern to
protect the rights of the poor in the administration of criminal
justice. Also, the Supreme Court's recent questioning of the
imprisonment of indigents, as indicated by Williams, Morris, and
Tate, reveals that the Court will not hesitate to consider similar
problems. It appears that the traditional "30 dollars or 30 days"
fine, as applied to indigents, will be struck down by the Supreme
Court when it is confronted with a factual situation paralleling
Frazier.
Gerald E. Songy
BROADENED COVERAGE UNDER THE LHWCA
In 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.' In addition to raising benefits2 and
making administrative changes,3 this recent legislation wrought
considerable changes in the substantive maritime law of the
United States. The provision dealing with third party liability
was amended to restrict an injured employee's action against
the shipowner to one based upon negligence, effectively denying
the "warranty of seaworthiness" to longshoremen. 4 Also eliminated was the "warranty of workmanlike service," which had
been read into maritime contracts to allow the shipowner to
70. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970), as amended by Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576 (Oct.
27, 1972), 86 Stat. 1251 [hereinafter cited as LHWCA 1972; reference to the
former Act will be made to the 1970 edition of the United States Code].
2. LHWCA 1972 §§ 5, 10.
3. E.g., the new legislation establishes a Benefits Review Board. LHWCA
1972 § 15.
4. LHWCA 1972 § 18. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946),
the Supreme Court had extended this no-fault tort remedy to those who
did work supposedly done by the members of the crew. For an analysis of
the harbor worker's unseaworthiness remedy, see George, Ship's Liability
to Longshoremen Based on Unseaworthiness--Sieracki through Usner, 3
J. MAR. & COMM. 45 (1971).
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seek indemnification from the injured longshoreman's employer.
This Comment will deal with the third major substantive change
made by the amendments, the broadened coverage provisions
of the Act.
Jensen: Situs and Status
In 1917 the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. JensenO
held that state workmen's compensation could not constitutionally apply to provide recovery for the death of a longshoreman occurring while unloading a vessel over navigable waters,
reasoning that
"[t]he work of a stevedore in which the deceased was
engaging is maritime in its nature; his employment was a
maritime contract; the injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the rights and liabilities ...were clearly

within the admiralty jurisdiction."7
The Court felt that to allow state legislation to apply to such
an occurrence would prejudice the national uniformity of the
maritime law envisioned by the constitutional grant of admiralty
jurisdiction to the federal government."
Implicit in Jensen was the premise that both of the bases
of admiralty jurisdiction, locality and maritime subject matter,9
had to be present before state workmen's compensation was
5. LHWCA 1972 § 18. In Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantio S.S.
Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), the Court held that the shipowner could recover
the amount paid to the injured longshoreman from his employer on the
basis of an implied warranty of workmanlike service. See Proudfoot, "The

Tar Baby": Maritime Personal-InjuryIndemnity Action, 20

STAN.

L. Rsv. 423

(1968).

6. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
7. Id. at 217.
8. The federal judicial power extends to "all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. It has always been assumed
that this grant of judicial jurisdiction vested in the federal government the
competency to formulate, judicially and legislatively, the rules for decision
in admiralty cases. Detroit Trust Co. v. Barlum S.S. Co., 293 U.S. 21 (1934).
Since Jensen it has become axiomatic that federal legislative jurisdiction
over maritime matters is to some extent exclusive. Cf., e.g., Kossick v. United
Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961). But see American Waterways Operators, Inc.
v. Askew, 93 S. Ct. 1590 (1973).
9. Traditionally, tort jurisdiction was "exclusively dependent upon the
locality of the act." Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C.D. Me. 1813).
Contract jurisdiction "extends over all contracts . . . which relate to the
navigation, business, or commerce of the sea ....
" DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F.

Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
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barred. Later cases explicitly required that the injury take place
over navigable waters 0 and that the injured employee be engaged
in work of a maritime nature." Should either of the criteria
be missing, the cases indicated navigation or commerce was
not unconstitutionally affected by application of state compensa2
tion legislation.
10. State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922). Not
yet envisioned were the cases allowing recovery for personal injury wherein
admiralty jurisdiction was based solely upon the employment relationship.
See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943) (maintenance and cure);
and O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943) (Jones
Act).
11. "In ... [Jensen] the employment or contract was maritime in nature
and the rights and liabilities of the parties were prescribed by general
rules of maritime law essential to its proper harmony and uniformity. Here
•.
their rights and liabilities had no direct relation to navigation, and
the application of the local law cannot materially affect any rules of the
sea whose uniformity is essential." Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde,
257 U.S. 469, 477 (1922). Compare Ex parte Rosengrant, 213 Ala. 202, 104 So.
409, aff'd mem. sub nom. Rosengrant v. Harvard, 273 U.S. 664 (1927), (held
that maritime contract jurisdiction over the contract of employment was
necessary to preclude the application of a state workmen's compensation
statute), with Irn re Lahti v. Terry & Tench Co., 240 N.Y. 292, 148 N.E. 527
(1925), rev'd per curiam sub nom. State Indus. Bd. v. Terry & Tench Co.,
273 U.S. 639 (1926) (state court had held that occurrence of the accident
over navigable waters was sufficient to preclude recovery under state law).
Examples of instances in which state compensation legislation was found
applicable included injuries sustained in new ship construction, Grant SmithPorter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); the drowning of a marine
diver sawing logs to aid the navigability of a channel, Millers' Indem.
Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926); injuries to those engaged in
logging operations, Sultan Ry. v. Department of Labor, 277 U.S. 135 (1928);
and injury to a cannery worker, Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467 (1928). On the other hand, injuries to those
engaged in maritime employment could not be compensated under state
law. Such occupations included seamen, Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U.S. 149 (1920); longshoring, Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 'U.S. 219
(1924); and the repairing of completed vessels, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479 (1928).
12. At the same time the Court allowed the application of state statutes
other than workmen's compensation laws where "the specified modification of or a supplement to the rule applied in admiralty courts . . . will
not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of
that law in its international and interstate relations." Western Fuel Co. v.
Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921). In Garcia, the application of a state wrongful death statute and its limitations provision was allowed. While the case
is important to the present discussion in that it meant that an injured
employee whose remedy lay under state law could find his action timebarred if he delayed by mistakenly proceeding in admiralty, confusion
can arise from the attempt to discover if employment is non-maritime from
an analysis of such a case. The term "maritime but local," used to describe
situations in which state compensation laws were found to be constitutional
because the employment was non-maritime (in that it did not affect navigation), has been used to describe all those situations in which state legislation concerning an arguably maritime matter was found to be permissible.
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The Longshoremen's Act of 1927: Structure and
Traditional Interpretation
Jensen left longshoremen and harbor workers burdened by
nineteenth century concepts of industrial compensation, constrained to sue in tort subject to the defenses of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant doctrine.'8
Desirous of affording the waterfront worker a compensation
remedy, Congress attempted on two occasions to make state
compensation applicable in those situations so affected. 14 Both
were rejected as unconstitutional delegations of federal competence to the states. 15 It was obvious that only a complete
scheme of federal compensation would meet the constitutional
test set forth by the Court, and in 1927 Congress enacted the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.' 6
Three provisions of the Act determined the employees to
be covered. An "employee" was defined in the negative: "The
term employee does not include a master or member of a crew
of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or
unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net."' 7
An "employer" under the Act was "an employer any of whose
13. These comprise the so-called "unholy trinity." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
at 526-27 (4th ed. 1971). Land-based workers could
recover under state compensation schemes and seamen could recover maintenance and cure without proof of fault.
14. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216,
42 Stat. 634.
15. In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), the widow
of a bargeman drowned in navigable waters brought an action under the
New York Compensation Law, as approved by the 1917 legislation, which
had amended the savings clause to preserve "to claimants the rights and
remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state." The Court
held since Jensen had found that the Constitution precluded states from
altering the maritime law governing such an injury, Congress could not
authorize such legislation.
In 1922, Congress tried again, this time excepting "masters and members of the crew" from the delegation, i.e., amended the savings clause to
preserve "to claimants for compensation for injuries to or death of persons
other than the master or members of the crew of a vessel, their rights
and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any State . .. .
Apparently Congress had read Knickerbocker Ice as merely prohibiting
federal legislation delegating competency to prescribe compensation remedies for seamen, as a seamen had been involved in that case. Congress
apparently had not read Jensen, however, and in Washington v. Dawson
A Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924), the Court reiterated its earlier position: stevedoring is a maritime employment, the injuries took place over navigable
water, ergo delegation to the states would disrupt the uniformity of the
maritime law required by the Constitution.
16. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424.
17. 33 U.S.C. § 902 (3) (1970).
OF THU LAW OF TORTS § 80,
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employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or
in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock)."'18 The real problems arose from the provision titled "Coverage":
"Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in
respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if
the disability or death results from an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including
any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death
through workmen's compensation proceedings may not
validly be provided by State law.'19 (Emphasis added.)
The requirement that the injury take place over navigable
waters presented no real difficulty;20 if the injury took place
elsewhere, compensation under the Act was expressly excluded.
Under the traditional view, the "validly provided by State law"
phrase was an attempt to allow the state compensation schemes
to operate to the limits of their constitutionality.21 Thus, if the
claimant was engaged in non-maritime employment, state compensation was available, and the Longshoremen's Act was inapplicable by its own terms. On the other hand, if the claimant
was engaged in maritime employment, state compensation
schemes were constitutionally inapplicable, and federal compensation would be recoverable.
The mutual exclusivity of the state and federal compensation schemes presented grave problems. It placed the claimant
in the quandary of deciding which remedy to pursue, negating
18. Id. § 902 (4).
19. Id. § 903 (a).
20. In his article, The Conflict of Laws ProbZenm Between the Longshoremen's Act & State Workmen's Compensation Acts, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 699,
712 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Larson, The Conflict of Laws Problem],
Professor Larson discusses the few problems that did arise in determining whether the injury took place over navigable waters.
21. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-46, at 339 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK]. Those who were to administer the
Act were informed that the "validly provided by State law" phrase was
to be so interpreted. Longshoremen's Act, Opinion No. 80, United States
Employees' Compensation Comm'n, Washington, D.C., Jan. 26, 1928. The
traditional Interpretation was finally discarded In Calbeck v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962). Few have been willing to accept the theory expressed
by Justice Brennan's majority opinion that Congress did not intend to incorporate the Court's "maritime but local" doctrine into the Act. See, e.g., the
authorities cited In D. ROBERTsoN, ADMIRALTY & FEDERALISM 304-05 nl. 3-7
(1970). Prof. Robertson is one of the few who accord some credence to
Justice Brennan's ideas. Id. at 214.
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one of the prime functions of a compensation remedy-alacrity
and certainty. It placed on the Deputy Commissioners the burden of determining the constitutionality of the state act.
Motor Boat, Davis, and the "Twilight Zone"
In 1938, a janitor in a boat store made a one-time excursion
upon navigable waters to help a fellow employee test an outboard engine. He was drowned when the boat capsized, and his
widow sought compensation under the Longshoremen's Act.
Under prior jurisprudence, compensation would have been
barred, because such employment was obviously non-maritime.
22
The Supreme Court, however, upheld an award under the Act
in a decision that seemed to abolish the "maritime but local"
doctrine: 28
"For habitual performance of other and different duties on
land cannot alter the fact that at the time of the accident
he was riding in a boat on a navigable river, and it is in
connection with that clearly maritime activity that the award
24
was here made.1
Apparently the situs of the injury was to be the sole criterion
for recovery of federal compensation. Assuming that federal
and state compensation were mutually exclusive (as the language of the Act indicates), the "Jensen line" dividing navigable
waters from the shore would apparently delimit the application of state and federal compensation.
25
A year later, however, the Court rendered its startling
decision in Davis v. Department of Labor & Industries,"e which
made it clear that state compensation statutes still retained
some vitality seaward of the "Jensen line." In Davis, an em22. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
23. Gu.MORs & BLACK § 6-49, at 348: "Did the Motor Boat case mean that
the entire 'maritime but local' doctrine had been overruled? And did it
mean that the Court, as a matter of statutory construction . . had returned
to what might be called a strict Jensenism: that the States could not

'validly' provide relief for any Injury occurring on navigable waters? Considering the facts of the case, both questions might have to be answered
Yes . . . ." See note 12 supra, for a discussion of the "maritime but local"
doctrine.
24. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 247 (1941).
25. Professors Gilmore and Black indicate that "had It been suggested
in a law review article, [It] would have been dismissed as academic fantasy
bordering on insanity." GILMORE & BLACK § 6-49, at 348.
26. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
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ployee engaged in dismantling a bridge was killed while working on a barge situated on navigable waters, and his widow
sought state compensation. The Supreme Court reversed the
Washington court's denial of recovery,2 stating that "there is
a twilight zone in which the employees must have their
rights determined case by case ...

-28 The gist of the deci-

sion was that situations in which, under the "maritime but
local" jurisprudence, uncertainty would exist as to which statute
was applicable, the presumptive constitutionality of the state
statute would compel an award under the state act; presumptive correctness of the Deputy Commissioner's administrative
decision would uphold an award under the federal act.2
Calbeck and Nacirema: Strict Situs Orientation
The "twilight zone" was a concession by the Court to the
demands of functional necessity80-so long as state and federal
compensation were supposedly mutually exclusive, some means
of administering the compensation schemes was needed which
did not require a determination of a state's constitutional competency to provide recovery for injuries incurred over navigable
waters. In 1962, the Supreme Court abrogated the need for the
"twilight zone" by holding, in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance
Co.,81 that in passing the Longshoremen's Act,
"Congress invoked its constitutional power so as to provide
compensation for all injuries sustained by employees on
navigable waters whether or not a particular injury might
also have been within the constitutional reach of a state
workmen's compensation law."a
State and federal compensation were therefore no longer mutually exclusive.
In Calbeck, an employee engaged in new ship construction
was killed, and his widow sought federal compensation. In Grant
27. Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries, 12 Wash. 2d 349, 121
P.2d 365 (1942).
28. 317 U.S. at 256.
29. GLmuoR & BLAcK § 6-49, at 353.
30. Justice Frankfurter concurred in Davis, but recognized that "[t]heoretic illogic is inevitable so long as the employee in a situation like the

present is permitted to recover either under the federal act or under a
state statute." 317 U.S. at 259 (citations omitted).
31. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
32. Id. at 117.
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Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde,33 the Court had previously held
that ship construction was not maritime employment, and that
injuries sustained in such employment were compensable under
state law. The Fifth Circuit, relying on Rohde, found the Longshoremen's Act inapplicable, as recovery could be provided by
state law.3 4 The Supreme Court held that a consideration of the
employee's status was unnecessary, so long as the situs of the
injury was over navigable waters. While much criticized for
apparently reading out of the Act the problematical provision
"ifrecovery... may not be validly provided by state law,"35 situs
orientation certainly accommodated administration of the Act.
Some courts, however, viewed Calbeck not as a construction of the Act as situs-oriented, but as simply a call for
expanded coverage of the federal act and its more liberal
33. 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
34. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961). It might
be noted that two post-Davis decisions had intimated that prior decisions
finding certain types of employment to be compensable under state or
federal law did not preclude a finding that such employment fell within
the "twilight zone" and was hence compensable under either scheme of
compensation. Moores' Case, 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478, afj'd mem. sub
nor. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948); and Baskin v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 632, 201 P.2d 549, reV'd per
curiam, 338 U.S. 854 (1949), on remand to the state court, 97 Cal. App. 2d
257, 217 P.2d 733, aff'd mem. sub nor. Kaiser Co. v. Baskin, 340 U.S. 886
(1950). Both cases involved injuries to ship repairmen who sought state
compensation. In Great Lakes Dredge d Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S.
479 (1923), the Supreme Court had held such to be maritime employment
and hence noncompensable by the states. In Moores' Case, however, the
Massachusetts court decided to "treat the Davis case as intended to be a
revolutionary decision . . . designed to include within a wide circle of
doubt all water front cases involving aspects pertaining both to the land
and to the sea ... even though a careful examination of numerous previous
decisions might disclose an apparent weight of authority one way or the
other." 323 Mass. at 167, 80 N.E.2d at 481. Accordingly, state compensation
was awarded, and the Supreme Court affirmed, citing Davis. 335 U.S. 874,
875 (1948). The California court, on the other hand, decided that the "case
instead of being in the 'twilight zone' is definitely on the same side of the
line as the numerous cases ... which have followed the rule which Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen [citations omitted] laid down ...." Baskin v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 632, 637, 201 P.2d 549, 553 (1949), and
denied state compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, citing Davis and
Moores, 338 U.S. 854 (1949). This reasoning of the Court could easily have
been applied in Calbeck to expand the twilight zone on the federal side
(i.e., in a situation where the precedent was clear that state compensation
could "validly be provided by State law").
35. Mr. Justice Stewart in dissent wrote, "The Court concludes that
Congress did not really mean what it said. I cannot join in this exercise
in judicial legerdemain. I think the statute still means what it says, and
what it has always been thought to mean .... ." Calbeck v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 370 U.S. 114, 132 (1962). The literature has been equally harsh with the
Court's reasoning, though generally approbative of the result. See authorities cited In D. ROBERTSoN, ADMIRALTY & FEDERALISM 304-05 nn. 3-7 (1970).

1973]

COMMENTS

recovery. 6 However, in Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson,81
the Court concluded that Congress "chose... the line in Jensen
38
separating water from land at the edge of the pier" to limit
coverage of the Act rather than covering all maritime employment irrespective of the situs of the injury. While perhaps questions could arise concerning the extent to which state workmen's compensation statutes applied seaward of the "Jensen
line,"89 the coverage of the federal act was definitively delimited.
Thus, a discussion of the status of the employee was no longer
necessary.
Coverage under the Amended Act
The coverage provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act were amended by changing three
provisions of the Act. The term "employee" now means "any
person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
and a harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder and
shipbreaker." 40 Second, "employer" was redefined as "an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the
United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, drydock,
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)."41 Finally, the section titled "Coverage"
was amended by deleting the cryptic phrase, "if recovery for
the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law," and by
adding that recovery was available for injuries occurring upon
navigable waters of the United States "including any adjoining
pier, wharf, drydock, terminal, building way, marine railway,
or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in
loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel. '42
36. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968),
rev'd sub nom. Nacicema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969);
Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd,
344 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1965)
37. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
3X Id. at 224.
39. For an exhaustive treatment of the jurisprudence dealing with this
problem, see Larson, The Conflicts of Laws Problem, supra note 20, at 721.
40. LHWCA 1972 § 2, amending 33 U.S.C. § 902 (3) (1970).
41. Id., amending 33 U.S.C. § 902 (4) (1970).
42. Id., amending 33 U.S.C. § 903 (a) (1970).
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In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson,48 the Supreme Court
indicated that extension of the coverage of the Longshoremen's
Act to all injuries within the admiralty jurisdiction would meet
constitutional muster.44 The Court's later decision in Victory
Carriersv. Law,4 5 however, denied extension of admiralty jurisdiction to shoreside injuries solely on the basis of the injured
employee's status as a longshoreman.4" The amended coverage
provisions would be unconstitutional if solely based upon the
power to legislate in the field of maritime affairs. Furthermore,
even if status was enough to confer admiralty jurisdiction,
extension of the coverage to ship builders is constitutionally
questionable, as traditionally building a ship is not a maritime
contract, and therefore such employment is non-maritime. 47
However, it is a fundamental tenet of constitutional law that
if Congress has the power to enact legislation under any of its
enumerated powers, it will be upheld against constitutional
attack, irrespective of an effect which could not be reached
directly (e.g., the extension of the admiralty jurisdiction) .4
As Congress could legislate under the commerce clause to provide
a system of compensation for employees who so directly affect
international and interstate commerce, the amendments should
withstand constitutional attack.
The obvious intent of the amendments is to legislatively
overrule Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson,49 thus providing
compensation "to a longshoreman or a ship repairman or builder
." that would "not depend on the fortuitous circumstance
43. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
44. "[We have do doubt that Congress had the power to choose either
of these paths [strict situs orientation or coverage co-extensive with the
admiralty jurisdiction] in defining the coverage of its compensation remedy
....
The invitation . . . must be addressed to Congress, not to this Court."
Id. at 223.
45. 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
46. The requirement of maritime subject matter set forth for admiralty
tort jurisdiction in Executive Jet, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 93 S. Ct. 493
(1973), would seem to be an additional requirement, not a substitute requirement, for maritime situs.
47. E.g., Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922). It
might be argued that after Executive Jet, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 93 S. Ct.
493 (1973) (held the mere occurrence of an injury over navigable waters
not enough to confer admiralty jurisdiction), extension of coverage to shipbuilders injured even on navigable waters would be constitutionally questionable. The Calbeck decision, however, should be dispositive of this issue,
and might even be read as abrogating the ancient rule withholding the
jurisdiction from such contracts.
48. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
49. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
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of whether the injury occurred on land or over water." Congress did, however, apparently intend to limit coverage under
the amended Act to "high-risk maritime activity,"5' 1 and not
52
extend compensation to anyone injured in the broadened area.
Formerly, recovery under the Act was restricted to high risk
employment by the requirement that the injury occur over
navigable waters, thus excluding clerical workers and the like.
Now the Act accomplishes this same purpose by more narrowly
defining "employee." Had Congress in its desire to cover all
injuries sustained by longshoremen, ship repairmen, ship builders, and others protected by the original Act merely extended
the coverage of the Act inland, any worker injured in that
locality would have been covered. Under Calbeck and Nacirema
coverage was situs-oriented; any employee, whether or not
engaged in maritime employment, could recover for injuries
sustained on navigable waters, provided only that his employer
had "employees ... employed in maritime employment." 53 Now,
in order to recover, the employee must once again show his won
status as a maritime employee before the broadened situsoriented coverage provision will inure to his benefit.
50. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, LONGSHOREMEN'S & HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S. REP. NO. 1125, 92d Cong.,

2d Sess. 13 (1972).
51. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 225 (1971) (appendix to
dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
52. "The intent of the Committee is to permit a uniform compensation
system to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by this
Act for part of their activity [that part which occurs over navigable waters]
.... The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not
engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because
they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such
activity. Thus, employees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored
cargo for further trans-shipment would not be covered, nor would purely
clerical employees whose jobs do not require them to participate in the
loading or unloading of cargo .... Likewise, the Committee has no intention of extending coverage under the Act to individuals who are not
employed by a person . . . at least some of whose employees are engaged,
in whole or in part in some form of maritime employment." SENATE COMM.
ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, LONGSHOREMEN'S & HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S.REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972).
53. In Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953), the Court
said "§ 902 (4) is directed at the employer when it speaks of maritime
employment, not at the work the employee is doing. . . . The Court of
Appeals, we think, is in error in holding that the statute requires, as to the
employee, both injury on navigable water and maritime employment as a
ground for coverage by the Compensation Act." Id. at 340. What the Court
neglected to say is that its "maritime but local" decisions had been
incorporated into the Act in the clause excluding recovery if compensation
could "validly be provided by State law," and these decisions turned on
whether the employee's employment was maritime. Cf. text at note 12 supra,
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It is submitted that the decision as to whether an injured
employee is "engaged in maritime employment" may reintroduce
the problems which were evident when a determination of
whether compensation "may not validly be provided by State
law" was required.54 The issue is no longer of constitutional
magnitude, as it was when the Deputy Commissioners were
called upon to determine whether a state could have validly
provided a remedy without unduly disturbing the uniformity
of the maritime law. However, the question will certainly arise
as to what standards are to be relied upon in determining what
is "maritime employment." The "maritime but local" or the
"twilight zone" jurisprudence could be reinvestigated; all cases
allowing compensation under the federal act before Davis or
under either act thereafter could be construed as having found
the employment to have been maritime. The argument could
also be made that the confusion over the basis of the Jensen
decision has rendered all prior jurisprudence a hopeless maze,
and that a new determination of what is "maritime employment"
is required. Hopefully, the courts will not infer that Congress
intended to eliminate compensation in areas to which it had
previously been granted (i.e., over navigable water), and leave
the matter to be determined as a question of fact by the Deputy
Commissioners, who presumably will construe it liberally.
Preemption of State Compensation Legislation
Presumably, recovery will be available under state statutes
in those instances where federal compensation is found to be
inapplicable. Problems may arise, however, if state compensation is sought in areas included by the expanded coverage. The
problem is not a constitutional bar to application of state compensation schemes, for even the jurisprudence prior to the 1927
Act, generally restrictive of state legislation, recognized that
injuries sustained in maritime employment are constitutionally
compensable by the states if not incurred over navigable
waters. 5 The problem arises, then, as a matter of statutory
54. E.g., would coverage be extended to a cannery worker or a lumberman? In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467
(1928), and Sultan Ry. 4 Timber Co. v. Department of Labor, 277 U.S. 135
(1928), status as maritime employees was denied to these categories of
workers.
55. State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
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construction: does the extended coverage preempt state legislation from applying concurrently in areas in which state legislation could constitutionally apply in the absence of federal legislation? The problem could not arise under the old Act, because
it expressly recognized the validity of state legislation within
their constitutional limits.50 Approaching the problem as res
nova, then, it is submitted that no such preemption should be
found. The purpose of expanding federal coverage was to insure
a substantial remedy.57 In light of the confusion likely to arise
as to the coverage of the amended Act, it would seem contrary
to this purpose to force an injured employee to seek compensation under the state or federal scheme, only to be told his
guess was incorrect.58 Dual coverage would seem to aid rather
than hinder this function. 59 The employer is in no way disadvantaged, as the cost of insuring for both acts is minimal, 0
and double recovery would of course not be allowed. 1
56. See Larson, The Conflicts of Laws Problem at 721 for an excellent
analysis of the constitutional range of state workmen's compensation statutes in the era from Davis until Nacirema.
57. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), the Supreme
Court set forth the criteria by which to judge the validity of state legislation challenged under the supremacy clause. All of those criteria would
seem to support the validity of state compensation schemes although federal
compensation would also be available. "Congress legislated here in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the ...
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
Id. at 230 (citations omitted). In spite of Jensen, federal interest in compensating injured employees should not be found to be "so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject." Id.
Note should be taken of Askew v. The American Waterways Operators,
Inc., 93 S. Ct. 1590 (1973), which perhaps foreshadows a tendency to allow
the states great latitude in supplementing federal legislation in the area of
maritime affairs.
58. The federal compensation should not then be "so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
59. This is not an area where "state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute," as state legislation should
only be allowed to supplement, not restrict, federal recovery. Id.
60. 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION § 89.70, at 460

n.85 (1971).
61. In Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), the Court held
that acceptance of state benefits did not constitute an election of remedies
to bar later supplemental recovery under the Longshoremen's Act. Later
cases, however, held that an adjudication of the applicability of the state
act would preclude recovery under the federal act. Cf., e.g., Shea v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 383 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1967). Similar standards could
be formulated for determining when a claimant has made a binding election of remedies, to protect employers and their insurers from the vexation
of multiple claims.
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Conclusion
In principle, the amended coverage provisions are to be
welcomed. Recovery for "these hard-working men, engaged in
a somewhat hazardous employment,"8 2 should not depend upon
whether the injury takes place on the vessel or a few feet away
on the dock. However, once again calling for a determination
of whether the employee's status can be classified as "maritime"
may reopen the Pandora's Box which was closed by Calbeck
and Nacirenm.
Harold K. Watson
62. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMPENSATION FOR EMPLOYERS IN
MARITIME EMPLOYMENTS, S. REP. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16
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